With Iraq caught in the throes of a low-grade civil war on one end and an aspiring Shia bid for domination on the other, President Bush proposed his long-awaited change in strategy for Iraq on Wednesday night. To succeed, it will need to overcome a number of significant challenges. A sketch of the more important challenges is in order.
Enough Manpower$%:
In his speech, President Bush called for sending "more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq." The "vast majority" would be deployed to Baghdad. That figure would still leave total U.S. manpower far short of what would be needed to bring stability to Iraq through military means, especially if the quality and performance of Iraq's security forces and personnel do not improve markedly. Prior to the war, General Eric Shinseki estimated that "several hundred thousand" troops would be required. The 1999 "Desert Crossing" simulation that envisioned many of Iraq's current problems assumed 400,000 soldiers. Now that Iraq has witnessed the rise of increasingly well-armed and organized militias and an outbreak of low-grade civil war, those estimates may be conservative.
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Furthermore, there is recent precedent for failure of a similar mini-surge. In August 2006, the U.S. and Iraqi transitional government "surged" police and military manpower into Baghdad in a bid to stem the rise in violence that had been occurring. That effort failed dramatically.
Reliance on a Largely Sectarian Iraqi Government/Sunni Distrust:
President Bush's new strategy will provide U.S. muscle to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's plan for securing Baghdad. By assuming the responsibility for implementing the Maliki plan, especially if the Iraqi government fails to make a meaningful effort to disarm and dismantle the major Shia militias, the U.S. would risk playing a dangerously sectarian role. Following closely on the heels of the U.S. handover of Saddam Hussein to the Maliki government and that government's hanging him on the dawn of a major Sunni religious holiday, such a course could provide additional confirmation to already wary Sunnis that they cannot count on the United States to play an impartial role in Iraq's transformation.
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A strategy that winds up mainly advancing Shia aspirations for dominance is not a recipe for building a stable Iraq. Maintaining or tightening existing Sunni economic and political disenfranchisement will likely push Iraq further down the violent path of fragmentation. President Bush mentioned in his national address that Prime Minister Maliki promised Iraqis that "The Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation." This is not the Maliki government's first such pledge. To date, its record in carrying out such promises has proved poor. It has made no meaningful effort to disarm the Shia militias or to pursue national reconciliation. Relying on the two leading Shia militias for its political power, the Maliki government is at least as likely to retain its character as a largely sectarian government in spite of its fresh pledge to take on Shia and Sunni groups alike.
Already, at least one influential Sunni leader has expressed a lack of confidence in the Maliki government. He also revealed suspicions concerning the then yet-to-be released U.S. strategy. Harith al-Dari, head of the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq stated, "The tasks of this government include slaughter, arrest, abduction, and exclusion. It is not responsible for real security or economy or services for the people, who have been suffering for four years. Its task is military in nature. It has tried three security plans, but all of them have failed. Now, they want to try the new plan, in collaboration with U.S. President George Bush, with whom Al- Maliki had a telephone conversation two days ago that lasted an hour or more. He is now mobilizing the parties and militias for this plan." Those concerns will need to be effectively addressed if Iraq is to be stabilized.
Politically-isolated, the Sunnis will likely turn to such moderate Sunni-led states as Saudi Arabia for support. If such support is not forthcoming, Iraq's Sunni community could embrace the more radical Sunni insurgency and breathe new life into the Ba'athist movement. Worst of all, if Iraq's Sunni community is pushed to the brink of destruction, this situation could afford an opportunity for Al Qaeda in Iraq to be "mainstreamed," especially if Al Qaeda abandons its efforts to impose a harsh Taliban-type theocracy on Iraq's Sunnis. That development would have an enormous adverse impact on U.S. regional and global interests and efforts, including the overall war on Islamist terrorism. Yet, such a development cannot be written off altogether.
Absence of High-Level Diplomacy with Iran and Syria:
The proposed strategy rejected high-level diplomacy with Iran and Syria. Instead, the President delivered a blunt warning. "These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops," Bush declared, warning, "We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We'll interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq." Given the evolution of events in Iraq, it remains to be seen whether Iran or Syria view the threat as credible. At the same time, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. has the capability or willingness to execute that warning should Iran and Syria persist in their ongoing interference in Iraq. Eager to limit the risk of U.S. strikes on its nuclear facilities, Iran may well calculate that keeping the U.S. bogged down in Iraq offers it the best chance for avoiding such military strikes.
The absence of diplomacy presents a formidable risk. Diplomacy may be crucial to bringing about a substantial reduction in outside interference. In the absence of meaningful U.S. diplomacy, Iraq's neighbors will likely continue to act to protect and advance their own interests, not all of which are compatible with American ones. Given the region's history and political dynamics, Iraq's neighbors are unlikely to make efforts to stabilize Iraq in good faith alone unless their core interests are accommodated. Their national interests and ambitions are much broader than bringing stability to Iraq.
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Iran seeks regional hegemony. It seeks to transform Iraq into a satellite state from which it can project its growing power. It seeks to complete its nuclear program. Violence that is directed against Iraq's Sunni community and against U.S. interests limits the possibility of an effective U.S. response against its nuclear program. As such, it may be na:%$iuml;ve for the White House to expect that Iran, even with the President's warning, will cooperate to stabilize Iraq in the absence of tough direct negotiations. Iran likely will only seek to stabilize Iraq if the tide begins to turn against its Shia allies there and it has few good options for changing that outcome. Syria will likely continue to support a Shia-led Iraq on account of the support its minority Alawite regime has consistently received from Syria's minority Shia community, not to mention its deepening ties with Iran. The rise of an Iranian satellite state in Iraq is unacceptable for neighboring Sunni-led states such as Saudi Arabia. A stable Iraq that serves Iran's interests undercuts the critical interests of the region's moderate Sunni-led states. Hence, they won't act on good faith alone if that is likely to translate into a stable Iranian satellite. Instead, if the strategic position of Iraq's Sunni community deteriorates, Saudi Arabia and other predominantly Sunni neighbors will, more than likely, begin assisting Iraq's Sunni community.
All said, the combination of military manpower that may remain insufficient to impose a military solution, an absence of high-level bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagement with Iran and Syria, and a centering of the strategy around what has been a largely sectarian Shia-dominated government strongly indicates that the new strategy entails some major challenges. Those challenges will need to be overcome if the new approach is to produce substantially better results than the one it is replacing.
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